Automated Theorem Proving Lecture 4: First-Order Logic

Prof. Dr. Jasmin Blanchette based on slides by Dr. Uwe Waldmann

Winter Term 2024/25

Part 3: First-Order Logic

First-order logic

• is expressive:

can be used to formalize mathematical concepts, can be used to encode Turing machines, but cannot axiomatize natural numbers or uncountable sets,

- has important decidable fragments,
- has interesting logical properties (model and proof theory).

First-order logic is also called (first-order) predicate logic.

Syntax:

- nonlogical symbols (domain-specific)
 - \Rightarrow terms, atomic formulas
- logical connectives (domain-independent)
 - \Rightarrow Boolean combinations, quantifiers

Signatures

A signature $\Sigma = (\Omega, \Pi)$ fixes an alphabet of nonlogical symbols, where

- Ω is a set of function symbols f with arity n ≥ 0, written arity(f) = n,
- Π is a set of predicate symbols P with arity m ≥ 0,
 written arity(P) = m.

Function symbols are also called operator symbols. If n = 0 then f is also called a constant (symbol). If m = 0 then P is also called a propositional variable.

Signatures

We will usually use

b, c, d for constant symbols,

f, g, h for nonconstant function symbols,

P, Q, R, S for predicate symbols.

Convention: We will usually write $f/n \in \Omega$ instead of $f \in \Omega$, arity(f) = n (analogously for predicate symbols).

Refined concept for practical applications:

many-sorted signatures (corresponds to simple type systems in programming languages);

no big change from a logical point of view.

Predicate logic admits the formulation of abstract, schematic assertions. (Object) variables are the technical tool for schematization.

We assume that X is a given countably infinite set of symbols which we use to denote variables.

Terms over Σ and X (Σ -terms) are formed according to these syntactic rules:

$$s, t, u, v$$
 ::= x , $x \in X$ (variable)
 $| f(s_1, ..., s_n) , f/n \in \Omega$ (functional term)

By $T_{\Sigma}(X)$ we denote the set of Σ -terms (over X). A term not containing any variable is called a ground term. By T_{Σ} we denote the set of Σ -ground terms. Atoms (also called atomic formulas) over Σ are formed according to this syntax:

Whenever we admit equations as atomic formulas we are in the realm of first-order logic with equality. Admitting equality does not really increase the expressiveness of first-order logic (see next part). But deductive systems where equality is treated specifically are much more efficient.

Literals

 $\begin{array}{rcl} L & ::= & A & (\text{positive literal}) \\ & & | & \neg A & (\text{negative literal}) \end{array}$

 $F_{\Sigma}(X)$ is the set of first-order formulas over Σ defined as follows:

F, G, H	::=	\perp	(falsum)
		Т	(verum)
		A	(atomic formula)
		$\neg F$	(negation)
		$(F \wedge G)$	(conjunction)
		$(F \lor G)$	(disjunction)
		$(F \rightarrow G)$	(implication)
		$(F \leftrightarrow G)$	(equivalence)
		$\forall x F$	(universal quantification)
		$\exists x F$	(existential quantification)

Notational Conventions

We omit parentheses according to the conventions for propositional logic.

$$\forall x_1, \ldots, x_n F$$
 and $\exists x_1, \ldots, x_n F$ abbreviate
 $\forall x_1 \ldots \forall x_n F$ and $\exists x_1 \ldots \exists x_n F$.

Notational Conventions

We use infix, prefix, postfix, or mixfix notation with the usual operator precedences.

Examples:

$$egin{aligned} s+t*u & ext{for} & +(s,*(t,u))\ s*u &\leq t+v & ext{for} &\leq (*(s,u),+(t,v))\ -s & ext{for} & -(s)\ s! & ext{for} & -(s)\ s! & ext{for} & 1(s)\ |s| & ext{for} & 1(s)\ 0 & ext{for} & 0() \end{aligned}$$

Example: Peano Arithmetic

$$\begin{split} \Sigma_{\mathsf{PA}} &= (\Omega_{\mathsf{PA}}, \ \Pi_{\mathsf{PA}}) \\ \Omega_{\mathsf{PA}} &= \{0/0, \ +/2, \ */2, \ s/1\} \\ \Pi_{\mathsf{PA}} &= \{$$

Examples of formulas over this signature are

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x, y \left((x < y \lor x \approx y) \leftrightarrow \exists z \left(x + z \approx y \right) \right) \\ \exists x \forall y \left(x + y \approx y \right) \\ \forall x, y \left(x * s(y) \approx x * y + x \right) \\ \forall x, y \left(s(x) \approx s(y) \rightarrow x \approx y \right) \\ \forall x \exists y \left(x < y \land \neg \exists z (x < z \land z < y) \right) \end{aligned}$$

Positions in Terms and Formulas

The set of positions is extended from propositional logic to first-order logic:

The positions of a term s (formula F):

$$pos(x) = \{\varepsilon\},$$

$$pos(f(s_1, ..., s_n)) = \{\varepsilon\} \cup \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{ip \mid p \in pos(s_i)\},$$

$$pos(P(t_1, ..., t_n)) = \{\varepsilon\} \cup \bigcup_{i=1}^n \{ip \mid p \in pos(t_i)\},$$

$$pos(\forall x F) = \{\varepsilon\} \cup \{1p \mid p \in pos(F)\},$$

$$pos(\exists x F) = \{\varepsilon\} \cup \{1p \mid p \in pos(F)\}.$$

The prefix order \leq , the subformula (subterm) operator, the formula (term) replacement operator, and the size operator are extended accordingly.

The set of variables occurring in a term t is denoted by var(t) (and analogously for atoms, literals, clauses, and formulas).


In $Q \times F$, $Q \in \{\exists, \forall\}$, we call F the scope of the quantifier $Q \times A$. An *occurrence* of a variable x is called **bound**, if it is inside the scope of a quantifier $Q \times A$. Any other occurrence of a variable is called free.

Formulas without free variables are called closed formulas (or sentential forms).

Formulas without variables are called ground.

Bound and Free Variables

Example:



The occurrence of y is bound, as is the first occurrence of x. The second occurrence of x is a free occurrence.

Substitution is a fundamental operation on terms and formulas that occurs in all inference systems for first-order logic.

Substitutions are mappings

 $\sigma: X \to \mathsf{T}_{\Sigma}(X)$

such that the domain of $\sigma,$ that is, the set

$$\operatorname{dom}(\sigma) = \{ x \in X \mid \sigma(x) \neq x \},\$$

is finite. The set of variables introduced by σ , that is, the set of variables occurring in one of the terms $\sigma(x)$, with $x \in \text{dom}(\sigma)$, is denoted by $\text{codom}(\sigma)$.

Substitutions are often written as $\{x_1 \mapsto s_1, \ldots, x_n \mapsto s_n\}$, with x_i pairwise distinct, and then denote the mapping

$$\{x_1 \mapsto s_1, \dots, x_n \mapsto s_n\}(y) = \begin{cases} s_i, & \text{if } y = x_i \\ y, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We also write $x\sigma$ for $\sigma(x)$.

The modification of a substitution σ at x is defined as follows:

$$\sigma[x \mapsto t](y) = \begin{cases} t, & \text{if } y = x \\ \sigma(y), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We define the application of a substitution σ to a term t or formula F by structural induction over the syntactic structure of t or F by the equations on the next slide.

In the presence of quantification it is surprisingly complex: We must not only ensure that bound variables are not replaced by σ . We must also make sure that the (free) variables in the codomain of σ are not *captured* upon placing them into the scope of a quantifier Qy. Hence the bound variable must be renamed into a "fresh," that is, previously unused, variable z.

Application of a Substitution

"Homomorphic" extension of σ to terms and formulas:

$$f(s_1, \dots, s_n)\sigma = f(s_1\sigma, \dots, s_n\sigma)$$

$$\perp \sigma = \perp$$

$$\top \sigma = \top$$

$$P(s_1, \dots, s_n)\sigma = P(s_1\sigma, \dots, s_n\sigma)$$

$$(u \approx v)\sigma = (u\sigma \approx v\sigma)$$

$$\neg F\sigma = \neg (F\sigma)$$

$$(F \circ G)\sigma = (F\sigma \circ G\sigma) \text{ for each binary connective } \circ$$

$$(Qx F)\sigma = Qz (F \sigma[x \mapsto z]) \text{ with } z \text{ a fresh variable}$$

Application of a Substitution

If $s = t\sigma$ for some substitution σ , we call the term s an instance of the term t, and we call t a generalization of s (analogously for formulas). To give semantics to a logical system means to define a notion of truth for the formulas. The concept of truth that we will now define for first-order logic goes back to Tarski.

As in the propositional case, we use a two-valued logic with truth values "true" and "false" denoted by 1 and 0, respectively.

A Σ -algebra (also called Σ -interpretation or Σ -structure) is a triple

$$\mathcal{A} = (U_{\mathcal{A}}, (f_{\mathcal{A}}: U_{\mathcal{A}}^n o U_{\mathcal{A}})_{f/n \in \Omega}, (P_{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq U_{\mathcal{A}}^m)_{P/m \in \Pi})$$

where $U_{\mathcal{A}} \neq \emptyset$ is a set, called the universe of \mathcal{A} .

By Σ -Alg we denote the class of all Σ -algebras.

 Σ -algebras generalize the valuations from propositional logic.

A variable has no intrinsic meaning. The meaning of a variable has to be defined externally (explicitly or implicitly in a given context) by an assignment.

A (variable) assignment (over a given Σ -algebra \mathcal{A}), is a function $\beta: X \to U_{\mathcal{A}}$.

Variable assignments are the semantic counterparts of substitutions.

Value of a Term in ${\cal A}$ with respect to β

By structural induction we define

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta) : \mathsf{T}_{\Sigma}(X) \to U_{\mathcal{A}}$$

as follows:

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(x) = \beta(x), \qquad x \in X$$

 $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(f(s_1, \dots, s_n)) = f_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathcal{A}(\beta)(s_1), \dots, \mathcal{A}(\beta)(s_n)), \quad f/n \in \Omega$

Value of a Term in \mathcal{A} with respect to β

In the scope of a quantifier we need to evaluate terms with respect to modified assignments. To that end, let $\beta[x \mapsto a] : X \to U_A$, for $x \in X$ and $a \in U_A$, denote the assignment

$$\beta[x \mapsto a](y) = \begin{cases} a & \text{if } x = y \\ \beta(y) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Truth Value of a Formula in ${\cal A}$ with respect to β

 $\mathcal{A}(\beta) : \mathsf{F}_{\Sigma}(X) \to \{0, 1\}$ is defined inductively as follows:

$$egin{aligned} &\mathcal{A}(eta)(ot) \ = \ 0 \ &\mathcal{A}(eta)(ot) \ = \ 1 \ &\mathcal{A}(eta)(P(s_1,\ldots,s_n)) \ = \ ext{if} \ (\mathcal{A}(eta)(s_1),\ldots,\mathcal{A}(eta)(s_n)) \in P_\mathcal{A} \ & ext{then 1 else 0} \ &\mathcal{A}(eta)(s pprox t) \ = \ ext{if} \ \mathcal{A}(eta)(s) \ = \mathcal{A}(eta)(t) \ ext{then 1 else 0} \end{aligned}$$

 $\mathcal{A}(\beta) : \mathsf{F}_{\Sigma}(X) \to \{0, 1\}$ is defined inductively as follows:

 $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\neg F) = 1 - \mathcal{A}(\beta)(F)$ $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F \wedge G) = \min(\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F), \mathcal{A}(\beta)(G))$ $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F \lor G) = \max(\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F), \mathcal{A}(\beta)(G))$ $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F \to G) = \max(1 - \mathcal{A}(\beta)(F), \mathcal{A}(\beta)(G))$ $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F \leftrightarrow G) = \text{if } \mathcal{A}(\beta)(F) = \mathcal{A}(\beta)(G) \text{ then } 1 \text{ else } 0$ $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\forall x F) = \min_{a \in U_A} \{\mathcal{A}(\beta[x \mapsto a])(F)\}$ $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\exists x F) = \max_{a \in U_A} \{\mathcal{A}(\beta[x \mapsto a])(F)\}$

Example

The "standard" interpretation for Peano arithmetic:

$$egin{aligned} &U_{\mathbb{N}}&=&\{0,1,2,\ldots\}\ &0_{\mathbb{N}}&=&0\ &s_{\mathbb{N}}&:&n\mapsto n+1\ &+_{\mathbb{N}}&:&(n,m)\mapsto n+m\ &*_{\mathbb{N}}&:&(n,m)\mapsto n+m\ &*_{\mathbb{N}}&:&(n,m)\mapsto n*m\ &<_{\mathbb{N}}&=&\{(n,m)\mid n ext{ less than }m\} \end{aligned}$$

Note that \mathbb{N} is just one out of many possible Σ_{PA} -interpretations.

Example

Values over $\ensuremath{\mathbb{N}}$ for sample terms and formulas:

Under the assignment $\beta : x \mapsto 1, y \mapsto 3$ we obtain

- $\mathbb{N}(\beta)(s(x)+s(0)) = 3$
- $\mathbb{N}(\beta)(x+y\approx s(y)) = 1$
- $\mathbb{N}(eta)(\forall x, y (x+y \approx y+x)) = 1$
- $\mathbb{N}(\beta)(\forall z \, (z < y)) \qquad = 0$
- $\mathbb{N}(\beta)(\forall x \exists y \, (x < y)) = 1$

Ground Terms and Closed Formulas

If t is a ground term, then $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(t)$ does not depend on β , that is, $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(t) = \mathcal{A}(\beta')(t)$ for every β and β' .

Analogously, if F is a closed formula, then $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F)$ does not depend on β , that is, $\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F) = \mathcal{A}(\beta')(F)$ for every β and β' .

Ground Terms and Closed Formulas

An element $a \in U_A$ is called term-generated if $a = \mathcal{A}(\beta)(t)$ for some ground term t.

In general, not every element of an algebra is term-generated.

3.3 Models, Validity, and Satisfiability

F is true in A under assignment β :

$$\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F : \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{A}(\beta)(F) = 1$$

F is true in \mathcal{A} (\mathcal{A} is a model of *F*; *F* is valid in \mathcal{A}):

$$\mathcal{A} \models F : \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{A}, \beta \models F \text{ for all } \beta \in X \to U_{\mathcal{A}}$$

F is valid (or is a tautology):

$$\models F : \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{A} \models F$$
 for all $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma$ -Alg

F is called satisfiable if there exist A and β such that $A, \beta \models F$. Otherwise *F* is called unsatisfiable.

Entailment and Equivalence

F entails (implies) *G* (or *G* is a consequence of *F*), written $F \models G$, if for all $A \in \Sigma$ -Alg and $\beta \in X \rightarrow U_A$, we have

$$\mathcal{A},\beta\models F \quad \Rightarrow \quad \mathcal{A},\beta\models G$$

F and *G* are called equivalent, written $F \models G$, if for all $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma$ -Alg and $\beta \in X \rightarrow U_{\mathcal{A}}$ we have

$$\mathcal{A},\beta\models F \quad \Leftrightarrow \quad \mathcal{A},\beta\models G$$

Entailment and Equivalence

Proposition 3.3.1: $F \models G$ if and only if $F \rightarrow G$ is valid

Proposition 3.3.2: $F \models G$ if and only if $F \leftrightarrow G$ is valid.

Extension to sets of formulas N as in propositional logic, e.g.:

$$\begin{split} N \models F & :\Leftrightarrow & \text{for all } \mathcal{A} \in \Sigma \text{-} \text{Alg and } \beta \in X \to U_{\mathcal{A}} : \\ & \text{if } \mathcal{A}, \beta \models G \text{ for all } G \in N, \text{ then } \mathcal{A}, \beta \models F. \end{split}$$

Validity and unsatisfiability are just two sides of the same medal as explained by the following proposition.

Proposition 3.3.3:

Let F and G be formulas, let N be a set of formulas. Then

(i) F is valid if and only if
$$\neg F$$
 is unsatisfiable.

(ii) $F \models G$ if and only if $F \land \neg G$ is unsatisfiable.

(iii) $N \models G$ if and only if $N \cup \{\neg G\}$ is unsatisfiable.

Hence in order to design a theorem prover (validity checker) it is sufficient to design a checker for unsatisfiability.

Substitution Lemma

Lemma 3.3.4:

Let \mathcal{A} be a Σ -algebra, let β be an assignment, let σ be a substitution. Then for any Σ -term t

$$\mathcal{A}(eta)(t\sigma) = \mathcal{A}(eta \circ \sigma)(t)$$
,

where $\beta \circ \sigma : X \to U_A$ is the assignment $\beta \circ \sigma(x) = \mathcal{A}(\beta)(x\sigma)$.

Proposition 3.3.5:

Let \mathcal{A} be a Σ -algebra, let β be an assignment, let σ be a substitution. Then for every Σ -formula F

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F\sigma) = \mathcal{A}(\beta \circ \sigma)(F)$$

Substitution Lemma

Corollary 3.3.6: $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F\sigma \iff \mathcal{A}, \beta \circ \sigma \models F$

These theorems basically express that the syntactic concept of substitution corresponds to the semantic concept of an assignment.

Two Lemmas

Lemma 3.3.7: Let \mathcal{A} be a Σ -algebra. Let F be a Σ -formula with free variables x_1, \ldots, x_n . Then

$$\mathcal{A} \models \forall x_1, \ldots, x_n F$$
 if and only if $\mathcal{A} \models F$.

Two Lemmas

Lemma 3.3.8: Let \mathcal{A} be a Σ -algebra. Let F be a Σ -formula with free variables x_1, \ldots, x_n . Let σ be a substitution and let y_1, \ldots, y_m be the free variables of $F\sigma$. Then

 $\mathcal{A} \models \forall x_1, \ldots, x_n F$ implies $\mathcal{A} \models \forall y_1, \ldots, y_m F \sigma$.

Validity(*F*): \models *F*?

Satisfiability(*F*): *F* satisfiable?

Entailment(*F*,*G*): does *F* entail *G*?

Model(A,F): $A \models F$?

Solve(A,F): find an assignment β such that A, $\beta \models F$.

Solve(*F*): find a substitution σ such that $\models F\sigma$.

Abduce(*F*): find *G* with "certain properties" such that $G \models F$.

Let $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma$ -Alg. The (first-order) theory of \mathcal{A} is defined as

 $\mathsf{Th}(\mathcal{A}) = \{ G \in \mathsf{F}_{\Sigma}(X) \mid \mathcal{A} \models G \}$

Problem of axiomatizability:

Given an algebra \mathcal{A} (or a class of algebras) can one axiomatize Th(\mathcal{A}), that is, can one write down a formula F (or a semidecidable set F of formulas) such that

$$\mathsf{Th}(\mathcal{A}) = \{ G \mid F \models G \}?$$

Let $\Sigma_{Pres} = (\{0/0, s/1, +/2\}, \{<\})$ and $\mathbb{N}_+ = (\mathbb{N}, 0, s, +, <)$ its standard interpretation on the natural numbers.

Th(\mathbb{N}_+) is called Presburger arithmetic (M. Presburger, 1929). (There is no essential difference when one, instead of \mathbb{N} , considers the integer numbers \mathbb{Z} as standard interpretation.)

Presburger arithmetic is decidable in 3EXPTIME (D. Oppen, JCSS, 16(3):323–332, 1978), and in 2EXPSPACE, using automata-theoretic methods (and there is a constant $c \ge 0$ such that $Th(\mathbb{Z}_+) \notin NTIME(2^{2^{c^n}})$).

However, $\mathbb{N}_* = (\mathbb{N}, 0, s, +, *, <)$, the standard interpretation of $\Sigma_{PA} = (\{0/0, s/1, +/2, */2\}, \{<\})$, has as theory the so-called Peano arithmetic which is undecidable and not even semidecidable.

(Non)computability Results

- 1. For most signatures Σ , validity is undecidable for Σ -formulas. (One can easily encode Turing machines in most signatures.)
- 2. Gödel's completeness theorem:

For each signature Σ , the set of valid Σ -formulas is semidecidable. (We will prove this by giving complete deduction systems.)

3. Gödel's incompleteness theorem:

For $\Sigma = \Sigma_{PA}$ and $\mathbb{N}_* = (\mathbb{N}, 0, s, +, *, <)$, the theory $\mathsf{Th}(\mathbb{N}_*)$ is not semidecidable.

These complexity results motivate the study of subclasses of formulas (fragments) of first-order logic.