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Edith Elkind (Nanyang Technological University, Singapore): Distance Rationalizability of Voting Rules

03.09.2009 15:00
Wann 15:00 16:30 03.09.2009
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Some voting rules are naturally defined in terms of the smallest
number of modifications needed to transform a given preference profile
into one that has an "obvious" winner. A well-known example is
Dodgson's rule: the Dodgson score of a candidate A is the minimum
number of swaps of adjacent candidates needed to transform the given
profile into one in which A is the Condorcet winner, and  the winner
is the candidate with the smallest Dodgson score. Another example is
Young's rule: the winner is the candidate who becomes the majority
winner after deleting the smallest number of voters. It turns out that
many other well-known rules can be defined in a similar way, i.e., via
a notion of consensus (a set of profiles with a clear winner) and a
distance: given a profile, we identify the nearest (with respect to
the given distance) consensus profile, and declare the top candidate
in that profile the winner of the election. A voting rule that can be
described in this manner is called distance-rationalizable. In this
talk, we give an overview of recent results on distance
rationalizability of several classic voting rules, and outline
directions for future work.

Based on joint work with Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko.

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